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ΠΙΝΑΚΕΣ 
THE FAILURE OF THE GERMAN - BYZANTINE ALLIANCE 
ON THE EVE OF THE FIRST CRUSADE* 
After the defeat of Mantzikert and the final loss of Southern Italy 
in 1071, a semi-official apologist of the byzantine court, Michael Atta-
leiates, expressed himself on these terms : « . . . agony of death has been 
«xtended upon us since the Gothic and the most execrable nations have 
•conquered the East and the West, while we surrendered to naïvity and 
carelessness and, what is more true, to folly and fury. Because, raging 
-against ourselves and fighting without mercy and scorning death, we 
appeared to the foreign nations as cowards and without virility, pre-
fering to flee at war.. ,»1. 
This tremendous conquest of East and West by the most execrable 
nations, about which Attaleiates speaks, was the most serious blow to 
the integrity of the Byzantine territory. Scholars used to say2 that 
these military defeats in the East and the West opened a new period of 
Byzantine history, characterized by the continuous endeavour of the em-
perors of the house of Comneni to rescue the Balkan Peninsula and 
Western Asia Minor. But all this was the result—we dare say—the cry-
stallisation of new situations that arose as consequences of these de-
* Communication for the XVth International Congress of Byzantine Studies, 
Athens September 1976. 
1. Attaleiates, p. 198 CSHB : . . . περιέσχον γαρ ήμας ώδϊνες θανάτου κατά πασαν 
έώαν καΐ τήν έσπέραν των Γοτθικών καΐ μιαρωτάτων έπικρατησάντων εθνών, καΐ κα-
τατρυφησάντων της ημών εύηθείας ή αμελείας, ή τό γε άληθέστερον ειπείν, θεοβλαβείας 
και μανίας, δτι κατ αλλήλων λυττώντες καΐ άκρατώς τοϊς όμοφύλοις μαχόμενοι καΐ θανάτου 
καταφρονοϋντες, έν τοις άλλοφύλοις πολέμοις δειλοί καΐ άνάλκιδες και προ πολέμου τα νώτα 
•δίδοντες φαινόμεθα... Cf. also Bryennius ΠΙ, 3, p. 213 ed. GHAUTIER CFHB... facti δέ 
Χωροβάτοι και Διοκλεΐς τήν Ίλλυρίδα κακώς διετίθουν, καΐ το Φράγγων έθνος κατακυ­
ρίευσαν της Ιταλίας καΐ Σικελίας δεινά κατά 'Ρωμαίων έμελέτων... The byzantine authors 
design the Normans by the term Φράγγοι, while Germans are mentioned as 'Αλαμανοί. 
2. J. GAY, L' Italie méridionale et Γ empire byzantin, de Γ avènement de 
Basile 1er jusqu' à la prise de Bari par les Normands (867-1071), Paris 1904. F. 
CIIALANDON, Essai sur le règne d'Alexis 1er Comnène (1081-1118), Paris 1900. 
IDEM, Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile. Paris 1907. G. 
OST ROGO RSKY : Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates8, Munich 1963, pp. 
290-295. ERA L. VRANOUSSI, Alexios I Komnenos, article in the «Biographisches 
Lexicon zur Geschichte Süd-Osteuropas», vol. I (1974), pp. 48-49. 
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feats. When these disasters occured, Byzantium offered to the civili-
zed world of the eleventh century a tremendous and magnificent ap-
pearance, in spite of various minor misfortunes that might have occured 
locally at the eastern boundaries. A most powerful element that contri-
buted to the political prestige of the Byzantine Empire was the old al-
liance with the German Empire, confirmed by imperial marriages and 
weddings and aiming to avenge the danger of the Moslems of Europe 3. 
But, in the third quarter of the eleventh century, the point of union 
•and common interest of the German-Byzantine alliance, Southern Ita-
ly, obeyed another master : the Normans of Robert Guiscard were dee-
pening the breach between Christians smashing Byzantine power in I-
taly, while fighting against Saracen infidels*. Since Robert Guiscard 
became the Pope's sword, events grew worse for Byzantium that had 
broken its relations with the Papacy after the Schism of the year 1054. 
The task of fighting the Saracens of Sicily was trusted to the Normans 
•and the German - Byzantine alliance had no more reasons to be. 
So, the emperor Michael VII Doucas (1071 -1078) followed a con-
ciliatory policy against the Papacy and the Normans and recognized 
by implication Robert Guiscard's conquest of Southern Italy5. The 
;great Pope Gregory VII Hildebrand (1073 -1085) had every reason to 
be satisfied; by these means, all misunderstandings between the Churches 
of Rome and Constantinople since 1054 would disappear*. As it is 
3. Cf. P. CHARANIS, «Byzantium, the West and the Origin of the First 
•Crusade», Byzantion 19 (1949), pp. 17-36. W. OHNSORGE, «Das Kaiserbündnis 
von 842-844 gegen die Sarazenen», in «Abendland und Byzanz» Darmstadt 
1963, pp. 131-183. IDEM, «Die Entwicklung der Kaiseridee im 9. Jahrhundert und 
Süditalien», ibidem, pp. 184-226. IDEM, «Die Byzanzreise des Erzbischofs Gebhard 
von Salzburg und das päpstliche Schisma im Jahre 1062», ibidem, pp. 342-363. 
ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΑΣ ΦΙΛΟΠΟΤΛΟΪ, «Al δυτικαί πηγαί δια τήν Ιναντι των Νορμανδών 
πολιτικήν του Κωνσταντίνου Ι' Δούκα», Μνήμων 3 (1973), 1-14. 
4. W. HOLTZMANN, Papsttum, Normannen und griechische Kirche (Mis­
cellanea Bibliothecae Hertzianae) Munich 1961. Β. LEIB, Rome, Kiev et By-
zance au Xle siècle, Paris, 1924, p. 202 sqq. 290. 
5. P. CHARANIS, op. cit.. p. 19 and 21. It is to be noted that papal activity 
-after the quarrel with Henry IV aimed to the diplomatic isolation of the german 
king. Cf. JAFFE 5.201 (15/3/1081)... Henricum, hominem Christianae legis contem-
ptorem, ecclesiarum videlicet et imperii destructorem atque hereticorum auctorem 
•et consentaneum... (letter to Hermann, bishop of Metz). 
6. ST. RUNCIMAN, A history of the Crusades, vol. I, Cambridge 1953, 
pp. 98-101. Cf. also W. NORDEN, Papsttum und Byzanz, Berlin 1903, p. 44. 
F. DÖLGER, Rom in der Gedankenwelt der Byzantiner, in «Byzanz und die euro-
päische Staatenwelt» Darmstadt 1964, pp. 70-95. 
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often stated 7, in the spring of 1074, the Pope decided to send an army 
of western knights to help the Byzantines to recover Asia Minor from 
the Seljukids. This time, the loss of the western Byzantine provinces 
would be counterbalanced by the total recovery of the eastern provin-
ces with the help of the western enemies of the empire. And the Pope 
would then hold a council at Constantinople, where the Christians of the 
East would resolve their quarrels and aknowledge the supremacy of 
Rome 8. 
But the emperor Michael VII Doukas, head of this conciliatory 
and moderate policy was deposed in 1078. On hearing the news, Pope 
Gregory VII excommunicated the usurper Nicephorus III Botaneiates 
(1078 - 1081) 9. At the same time, the violent clash between Papacy 
and the German king Henry IV (1056- 1106) was reaching its apex; 
Gregory was for the moment victorious at Canossa (1077) and could 
concentrate his attention on the eastern affairs : so, the Normans under 
Robert Guiscard were encouraged to invade Byzantine territory10 . 
When the emperor Botaneiates in his turn was replaced by Alexius Com-
nenus, the excommunication was extended at once to the new emperor. 
It was the first that Western Europe attacked so openly the Byzantine 
Empire, aiming at its total destruction and using christian armies to 
that end. 
It was obvious that the moderate policy initiated by Michael VII 
7. Cf. W. OHNSORGE, Byzanzreise, pp. 345, 357, 361. F. KEMPF, Die· 
Kirche im Zeitalter der gregorianischen Reform. 44 Kapitel : Die Reformpolitik in 
den einzelnen Ländern, in : Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte, herausgegeben von 
H. JEDIN, Band ΙΠ : Die Mittelalterliche Kirche. Erster Halbband : Vom kirch­
lichen Frühmittelalter zur gregorianischen Reform. Freiburg-Basel-Vienna 1973, 
p. 432. 
8. JAFFE, Bibliotheca rerum germanicarum, vol. Π : Monumenta Grego­
riana, Berlin, 1865. Reg. Greg. VII, 1, 46, 49. II, 3, 137. P. RIANT, Inventaire 
des lettres historiques des Croisades, in, Archives de Γ Orient Latin I (1881), p. 57, 
59 sqq. C. ERDMANN-N. FICKERMANN, Briefsammlungen der Zeit Heinrichs 
IV. η. 23, p. 218, (MGH, Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit vol. V, Weimar 1950). 
9. MANSI XX, 508. Cf. also ST. RUNCIMAN, ibidem, p. 99. 
10. Cf. CHALANDON, Domination, p. 260-261. G. KOLIAS, «Ή εξωτερική 
πολιτική 'Αλεξίου Α' Κομνηνού (1081-1118)», Άθηνα 59 (1955), 241-288, IDEM : «Le 
motif et les raisons de Γ invasion de Robert Guiscard en territoire byzantin», in By-
zantion 36, (1966), pp. 424-430. Cf. also A. MAYER-PFANNHOLZ, «Heinrich 
IV und Gregor VII im Lichte der Geistesgeschichte», pp. 27-50 and A. BRACKMANN 
«Heinrich TV als Politiker beim Ausbruch des Investiturstreites», pp. 61-88, of the 
volume «Canossa als Wende» (Wege der Forschung XII), Darmstadt 1969. 
ετυπώθη την é~4r-79 
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could no longer last. The very existence of the Empire was at stake. 
Alexius I Comnenus had to react to avoid total disaster. An alliance 
with Henry IV was confirmed u and twice (autumn of 1082 and begin-
ning of 1083) the German king appeared before the walls of Rome 12. 
An anti-Pope, the bishop Guibert of Ravenna was proclaimed, while 
Guiscard left the Balkans and hurried to Italy to rescue Gregory VII, 
his protector. So, the Norman campaign in the Balkan Peninsula met 
with disaster and this was the first immediate result of the German-
Byzantine alliance. 
In spite of various embassies exchanged between the two emperors 
and large sums of money (144.000 pieces of gold and promise for ano-
ther 216.000 pieces) paid by the Byzantines for the recruitment of mighty 
armies in Germany throughout the years 1083 and 1084, Henry IV achie-
ved nothing serious against the Normans in Italy 13. On the autumn 
of 1084, Robert Guiscard was free again to invade the Balkans threa-
tening the Byzantine Empire with destruction. A pontifical chronicler, 
Bernold, attributes the failure of Henry IV to the following reasons : 
«...his temporibus rex Constantinopolitanus maximam pecuniam Heinrico 
quondam regi transmisit, ut Robertum Wiscardum, ducem Calabriae et 
Apuliae et iuratum militem domni papae ut ultionem eiusdem regis, 
bello appeteret. Nam Robertus iam dud urn fines Gonstantinopolitanorum 
invasit, iterumque illuc expeditionem moveri disposuit. Sed Heinricus 
acceptam pecuniam non in procinctum supra Roubertum, quod iu-
ramento promisit, set ad conciliandum sibi vulgus Romanum expendit, 
cuius adiutorio Lateranense palatium feria quinta ante palmas cum suo 
Ravennato Guiberto intra vit . . .» u . 
What followed is very uncertain. Anna Comnena no longer makes 
mention of Henry IV or of the German alliance after the year 1084. But, 
when Pope Gregory VII died in 1085, the Byzantines welcomed the news 
11. Anna Comnena III, 10, 3-10, ed. LEIB I, 133-136. Cf. also Benzo, bishop 
of Alba VI, 4=MGH, SSRG, XI, 664. Vita Heinrici IV imperatorie, MGH, SSRG, 
XII, 271. Also CHALANDON, Domination I, 267. Alexis, p. 68. DÒLGER, 
Regesten 1077. 
12. CHALANDON, Domination I, 272-274. 
13. CHALANDON, Domination I, 275-277. Cf. also G. MEYER von KNONAU, 
Jahrbücher des Deutschen Reiches unter Heinrich IV und Heinrich V, v. III, 441 sqq. 
14. Bernoldus in 1084=MGH, SSRG, V, 440. The whole story in details is 
reported also by CHALANDON, Domination I, 276-278. 
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from the West as a judgement from on high 1 5 . No doubt at all that 
Anna Gomnena was well aware of the danger that constituted the Nor­
mans of Southern Italy at the disposal of Papacy. However, during the 
years 1084-1089, new enemies were threatening the Byzantine Empire, 
this time from the North : the Petchenegs, crossing the Danube rushed 
on the town of Dristra and defeated there an imperial army in 1087. 
With the invaders was the former king of Hungary, Salomon, now 
deposed from his throne and the declared enemy of Henry IV of Ger­
many. . . 1 6. 
It is well known that two years later, at the Council of Melfi (Se­
ptember 1089), Pope Urban II (1088-1099) lifted the ban of excommu­
nication against Alexius I. The Byzantine emperor, once again giving 
proofs of his goodwill towards the Western Church, held that same month 
a Synod at Constantinople, where it was found that the Pope's name 
had been omitted from the diptychs «not by any canonical decision but, 
as it were, from carelessness» 1 7 . From the year 1089 on, the Byzantine 
15. Gaufredus Malaterra : Historia Sicula, in MIGNE PL 149, 1192. Cf. OHN-
SORGE, Byzanzreise, p. 361 claiming that :... «die Verhandlungen sind nach 1084 
nicht fortgesetzt worden»... Generally, Anna Comnena does' nt recognize pontifi­
cal authority over the West. Cf. her statement that .... καί ταϋτα πρώτου άρχιερέως 
καί ταΰτα προκαθημένου της οικουμένης άπάσης γενομένου, ώσπερ ούν καί οί Λατίνοι λέ-
γουσί τε καί οίονται* έστι γάρ καί τοΰτο της αλαζονείας αυτών... Ι, 13,4 : LEIB Ι, 48. 
That is why, throughout her work, she tends to justify the alliance between the ger-
man and the byzantine empires. Any way, she mentions Henry IV, only as... ρήξ 
Άλαμανίας Ένέριχος I, 13, 1 : LEIB I, 47. 
. 16. The chronology of the wars against the Petchenegs, in CHALANDON, Do­
mination I, 105-107. Cf. the mention given by Bernoldus in 1087=MGH, SSRG, V, 
446 : ...Salomon quondam rex Ungarorum scilicet a Latislao iam dudum regno pri-
vatus et in exilium expulsus, dum quiddam fortiter contra regem Grecorum moli-
tur, post incredibilem hostium stragem et ipse viriliter occubuit... Cf. also Anna Co­
mnena VII, I, I : LEIB II, 87, mentioning Salomon as... δημαγωγός... DÖLGER, Re-
gesten 1144. Also G. MORAVCSIK, Byzantium and the Magyars, Amsterdam, 
1970, p. 65. The years of Victor III (1086-1088) seem to have been quiet and without 
major events in the series of roman-byzantine relations... 
17. ...Ουδέ γαρ άπο κρίσεως συνοδικής καί διαγνώσεως την έκκλησίαν της 'Ρώμης 
άπορραγηναι της προς ήμας κοινωνίας, άλλ' άσυντηρήτως, ώς έοικεν, το του πάπα μή φέρε-
σθαι βνομα... Document no 2, p. 60 in W. HOLTZMANN, «Die Unions Verhandlungen 
zwischen Kaiser Alexios I. und Papst Urban II. im Jahre 1089», BZ 28 (1928), pp. 
38-67. Cf. also Bernoldus in 1089, ibidem, p. 450 : ... Domnus papa Cons tantino po-
litanum imperatorem ab excommunicatione per legatos suos absolvit, item literas 
Philippi, regis Francorum debitam ei subictionem promittentis suscepit... The mention 
imperator Constantinopolitanus is somewhat like an improvement of the mention 
rex Grecorum, used by Bernoldus for the year 1087. Cf. previous note 16. 
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policy abandoned the German alliance and aimed to find a new orien­
tation in the well-known pontifical plans of a Crusade in the East 1 8. 
In close connection with all these facts stand the four very im­
portant documents which have been published by Walther Holtzmann 
in 192819. All of them were written in 1089, the year of the byzantine-
papal rapprochement and present the Byzantines as being divided in 
their opinions. A former ambassador to the papal court and native of 
Italy, the Greek metropolitan of Reggio Calabria Basil who is in very 
good terms with the anti-Pope Clement III (Guibert of Ravenna), de­
fended the German alliance and complained that his colleagues, the Me­
tropolitan of Santa Severina and the Archbishop of Rossano Romanus 
had submitted themselves to Urban II, thus retaining their sees20, al­
though the treaties concluded between Alexius I and Henry IV were 
still in force 2 1. The editor of the documents pointed out that Basil's 
point of view was somewhat obsolete in 1089 (it could have been true 
for the years 1083-1084, when the Norman danger was still threatening 
the integrity of the byzantine empire) 22, since no source mentions the 
existence of any treaty with Germany for the years 1084-1089 n . So, 
concludes W. Holtzmann, in the year 1089, the Byzantines were already 
in their way to show their will to be in good relations with Pope Urban 
18. Cf. Bernoldus in 1091, ibidem, p. 450 : ... Domnus papa eo tempore in 
partibus Campaniae morabatur, et ab omnibus catholic is debita reverentia cole-
batur, videlicet a Constantinopolitano imperatore et a Philippo Francorum rege, 
aliisque diversorum regnorum principibus tarn aecclesiasticis quam secularibus ex-
Cepto in Teutonico regno, ubi ex catholicis in partem excommunicatorum avaricia 
decepti sponte sua se transtulerunt... As we see, Byzantium has definitely abandoned 
the german alliance and Alexius I is mentioned as imperator Constantinopolitanus 
constantly. 
19. Documents edited in the pages 59-67 of W. HOLTZMANN, «Unionsver­
handlungen...» ; cf. note 17. 
20. Document no 4, p. 67 : ... ό δέ μητροπολίτης Σευηρίνης και ό αρχιεπίσκοπος 
Ρουσιάνου τφ Ούρβανφ ύπετάγησαν καΐ δια τοϋτο καΐ έν τοις αυτών κατελείφθησαν 
θρόνο ις... 
21. Document no 4, p. 66 : ...ό δέ τοιούτος ρήξ 'Αλαμανίας ουνθήκας Ιχων μετά 
τοϋ βασιλέως ημών τοϋ αγίου, [άς] καΐ ή γραφή τοϋ πάπα 'Ρώμης Κλήμεντος περιέχει, ήτις, 
προς τήν άγιωσύνην σου απεστάλη, κατά τον καιρόν του ήρος, είπερ θεοϋ βούλησίς έστιν, 
είς άναίρεσιν τών άθεων Φράγγων μέλλει έν 'Ιταλία γενέσθαι ως παρά πάντων άκούομεν 
και αυτός ό Κλήμης μετ αύτοϋ, δς καΐ δια γραφής αύτοϋ έδήλωσέ μοι προς αυτόν άφικέ-
•σθαι, μη δυνηθέντος έμοϋ τούτο ποιήσαι... 
22. Cf. HOLTZMANN, ibidem, p. 57. 
23. HOLTZMANN, ibidem, p. 57, n. 5, p. 51. 
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(documents no s 2 and 3), and Basil of Reggio knows it very well, 
when he asks the Patriarch of Constantinople Nicolas III Grammaticos-
(1084-1111) to hand him the bishopric of Leucas in the Ionian Sea as-
a restitution for the lost see of Reggio Calabria **. 
While documents no 2 (i. e. the decision of the Synod at Constantino­
ple that the Pope's name must be mentioned again in the diptychs^ 
and no 3 (i.e. the invitation of the Patriarch to the Pope to send a con­
fession of faith) show obvious Byzantine tendency to reestablish cordial 
relations with the Papacy, documents 1 and 4 stand in obvious contra­
diction with this official point of view. Document no 1 is an answer of 
the anti-Pope Clement III to Basil of Reggio and explains that there 
is a schism among the Church, fomented by some bishops who were 
heretic and proclaimed a new Pope. And further : «.. .we cannot order, 
nor even write to the duke of Apulia, writes Clement III, nor to anyone 
of the Franks of Italy on the subject of your see; we know very well that 
they are our enemies... So, be patient for a while and, when a general 
restitution takes place, then you will be delivered your see...» * . 
According to Clement III , this much desired restitution will oc­
cur when, «.. .soon, our Son the king of Germany will come to us and
r 
then, he will restore everything, as well as your affairs...»26. There 
can be hardly any doubt that Clement expected a German campaign in 
Italy in the summer of 1089 and hoped that this victorious campaign 
would restore the Byzantine sees of Southern Italy to their former mas­
ters, because the new order established by Urban II, the heresiarch 
had to be smashed. 
The metropolitan see of Reggio Calabria was granted by Urban II 
Sto Rangerius of Marmoutiers 2 7, who, in his attempt to take possession 
of his see and gethering money from everywhere, was finally captured 
.·<•·-• 24. HOLTZMANN, ibidem, p. 57/8. 
v
•'•'••'• 25. Document no 1, p. 59-60 : ... τον δέ δοϋκαν ή έτερον τίνα των Φράγγων των· 
έν τη 'Ιταλία περί της εκκλησίας, ής εγραψας, οΰτε άξιοϋμεν οΰτε γράφομεν, έχθρωδώς ει-
$6τες είς ήμδς τούτους διακειμένους, άλλ' ύπόμεινον μικρόν αδικηθείς, ώς και ήμεϊς ύπο-
μένομεν, καΐ δταν γένηται των πραγμάτων άποκατάστασις, απολαβής καΐ σύ τον ϊδιον 
Ορόνον... 
'•''-' 26. Document no 1, p. 60 : ... τάχιον γαρ το ήμέτερον τέκνον ό βασιλεύς της 'Αλα-
μανίας καταλαμβάνει προς ή μας και οΙκΓνομηθήσονται πάντα καλώς, ομοίως δέ και τα πα­
ρά σου... ' 
27. MANSI XX, 725 (Concilium Melfitanum 1089, c. I, e. 8). Cf. HOLTZMANN* 
p . 54. * · ' · : . · · = 
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and killed by the prince of Capua Jordan, who is cited as άνθρωπος του 
ρηγος Άλαμανίας in document no 4. This must have happened in the 
summer of 1089, prior to the redaction of letter n° 4 and after the pro­
mise of Clement III to Basil of Reggio that «everything will be resto­
red». What is interesting here is not that Henry IV of Germany did not 
undertake any campaign to Italy in the summer of 1089, but that Cle­
ment III tried to convince Basil that the German king still believed in 
the validity of the treaty concluded between the Byzantine emperor 
and himself. So, Holtzmann's point of view, that the German alliance 
was not profitable to Byzantium in 1089 **, is not convincing ; the Ger­
man-Byzantine treaty, as it might have been understood by its Byzan­
tine partisans, was profitable to the empire for its western interests. 
That means that Henry IV, because of his quarrel with the Papacy poin­
ted out by Anna Comnena, would restore to the Byzantine Empire Sou­
thern Italy and destroy the Norman power at'the Pope's orders. In the 
Balkans, Byzantium would manage the situation somehow, as it was to 
be proved afterwards. 
As it has been already said, in 1087, the Petchenegs and the former 
king of Hungary Salomon assailed the empire and took Dristra. The 
fact that with them was a declared enemy of Henry IV, tends to demon­
strate that Byzantium and Germany still had common enemies in 1087. 
If we assume that the treaties were still in force in the spring of 1089, 
it might be easily deduced that they never lost their significance since 
1082, when they had been concluded. That is why the anti-Pope Cle­
ment III insisted on the German intervention in Italy that it would be 
profitable to Byzantium and there would be general restitution of all 
misfortunes and misdoings until then. 
But, to my knowledge, the German campaign in Italy expected by 
Clement III and Metropolitan Basil of Reggio never took place. Pope 
Urban II seemed to be immovable and strong enough to gather warriors2' 
So, Alexius I Comnenus, in the autumn of 1089, was compelled to change 
his western policy recognizing, as Emperor Michael VII Doukas had 
•done before him, the loss of Southern Italy and to concentrate all his 
endeavours to the recovery of Asia Minor, with the help of those people 
28. Cf. notes 22-24. > • 
29. Anna Comnena, writing after these events, attributes to the Pope of Rome 
the most extraordinary powers and possibilities, I, 13, 1 : LEIB I, 47 : ... 6 γάρ τοι. 
-πάπας της 'Ρώμης (γενναία δέ αύτη αρχή και στρατεύμασι παντοδαποΐςπεριφραττομένη).., 
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who had previously destroyed Byzantine power in the West. Naturally, 
this new orientation of the imperial policy affected too much the Me-
tropolitan of Southern Italy, who did not care about the recovery of 
Asia Minor, and Basil's objections are merely proofs of the existence of 
another policy prevailing until the year 1089 : the German-Byzantine 
alliance, aiming to the recovery of Southern Italy. 
After the loss of Asia Minor and Southern Italy, the confusion and 
lack of resolution during the reign of Nicephorus III Botaneiates was 
merely due to the priority that had to be given to the endeavours for 
recovery. Faced with the Pope's denial about the legitimacy of his reign, 
Nicephorus III was not in a position to follow Michael's plans for the 
recovery of Asia Minor with Western aid. So, he his successor, Alexius 
I, were naturally driven towards the German alliance. This alliance had 
as its goal the destruction of Papal military power; when the latter would 
be accomplished, Germany would rule over central Italy and Byzantium 
would rule over Southern Italy. Such was the custom at the beginning 
of the eleventh century and the content of all German-Byzantine under-
standing. This priority of «western recovery» was imposed to both allies, 
as long as the Papacy was in a position to threaten both empires, and 
it lasted till 1089. The failure of the German-Byzantine alliance was 
apparently due to the Byzantine hope that after the delinquency of 
Henry IV in 1089, the next target was the recovery of Asia Minor from 
the Seljukids. The emperor Alexius knew very well that a German aid 
for the reconquest of Asia Minor was out of the question. Three German 
campaigns in Italy between 1082 and 1085 were far from being decisive, 
although Italy was among the most prominent interests of a German em-
peror or king. After the long-expected campaign of the summer of 1089 
which finally did not occur, Alexius turned finally his attention to the 
new Pope Urban II, abandoning in a sense his former plans for the re-
covery of Southern Italy and, consequently, the German alliance. That 
meant a return to the policy followed by Michael VII Doukas during 
his reign. Basil of Reggio did not understand at once or did not want to 
believe that all previous plans were losing now their importance. He still 
believed in the possibility of recovery of the ecclesiastical sees of Sou-
thern Italy with German aid, and complained that various greek bishops 
aknowledged the new reality in Italy submitting themselves to Ur-
ban II. 
This sudden readjustment of Byzantine policy towards the Pope 
occurs only in 1089, although previous treaties with Henry IV of Ger-
many were still in force. In succeeding years Byzantium would aban-
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don all the more its persistent idea of the German alliance, and concen­
trate its attention to papal plans for an intervention in the East, an 
idea which the German alliance was not in position to realize. Finally, 
Papal intervention took the shape of the First Crusade in 1096. Anna 
Gomnena, describing this movement of masses towards Asia expresses 
herself this way (X,5,4) : «.. .it was the whole West, all that consists 
of barbaric nations living between the opposite shore of the Adriatic 
Sea ans the Columns of Hercules...». This passage is an implicit con­
fession that on the opposite shore of the Adriatic Sea there are no more 
possessions of the Roman empire nor hopes to recover them. Anna Co-
mnena's realistic appreciation corresponds to her imperial father's politi­
cal realism of renouncing once and for all to any kind of adventures be­
yond the Adriatic and recognizing that only Barbarians live there, who 
are to be employed accordingly by the Roman Empire. 
Thus, times had changed and the German-Byzantine alliance on the 
eve of the first Crusade had failed owing to its more than dubious 
goal : at the end of the eleventh century, the plan of a campaign against 
the Infidels prevailed over the plans of an alliance between the two 
empires aiming to restrain the power of the pontifical see. Starting from 
the middle of the ninth century, common plans to drive the Saracens 
out of Italy and Europe had been elaborated by Byzantine and Wes­
tern emperors in accord with one another. Now, all these endeavours had 
to be abandoned to the advantage of a new conception: the common 
campaign in the East. The council at Melfi and the synod at Constanti­
nople in September 1089 put an end to all hopes, obsolete in their manner 
to appreciate situations, that the German-Byzantine alliance could last 
any more. 
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